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THINKING THE UNTHINKABLE:
RECASTING THE PRESUMPTION
OF EDWARDS v. ARIZONA
EUGENE L. SHAPIRO*

Introduction
There is a certain quality to Edwards v. Arizona' and its progeny that discourages
predictions about their future development. In establishing a second tier of procedural
protections for the defendant who asserts his right to counsel under Miranda,2
Edwards set forth a clear prophylactic rule which has survived several significant
efforts at qualification and has withstood vigorous criticism by members of the Court.
The rule of Edwards is simple enough to state: when, during custodial interrogation,
a suspect requests the presence of an attorney, questioning must cease and the suspect
may not be interrogated without the presence of counsel unless the suspect himself
reinitiates conversation about the subject matter at issue? As articulated in subsequent
cases, it simply is presumed, irrebuttably, that "he considers himself unable to deal
with the pressures of custodial interrogation without legal assistance."4
Edward'judicially crafted prophylactic rule, constructed to address the expressed
needs of a suspect under Miranda, may be tempered only by the Court, but the Court
has repeatedly declined to do so. The Court has held that Edwards' ban on policeinitiated re-interrogation extends to questioning about unrelated matters5 even when
pursued by authorities of another jurisdiction,6 and it continues after the suspect has
consulted with an attorney.7 While a broad and somewhat controversial view of what
might constitute a suspect's re-initiation of conversation has evolved,' by and large the
protective rule of Edwards has remained fixed. In rejecting attempts at modification,
the Court has repeatedly praised Edwards'bright line quality as offering clear guidance
to law enforcement authorities as to what is permissible Understandably then,

* Professor of Law, Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law, University of Memphis. I wish to thank
my colleague, David Romantz, and my student assistant, William Allen, for their valuable comments.
1. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. See id. at 484-85.
4. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 683 (1988).
5. See id. at 677-78.
6. See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 150 (1990).
7. See id.
8. See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 (1983). For a recent criticism of Bradshaw, see
Leslie A. Lunney, The Erosion ofMiranda: Stare DecisisConsequences,48 CATH. U. L. REV. 727,78182 (1999).
9. See Roberson, 486 U.S. at 681; Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 634 (1986); Smith v. Illinois,
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discussion of potential limitations upon the Edwards doctrine may seem speculative
and even presumptuous.
It is in this context that courts and commentators have addressed the very important
question of when the protection of Edwards might end. To many, the need for some
limitation on the Edwards doctrine has been self-evident. On a seemingly intuitive
level, they have regarded as unsustainable the idea that a suspect must forever be
immunized from all police-initiated custodial interrogation, regardless of how many
years have passed since his request for an attorney and regardless of any intervening
circumstances that may have transpired.
This has resulted in developments in the area which are sometimes eagerly accepted
by lower courts as appropriate limitations upon the Edwardsdoctrine, but which lack
a cohesive rationale. Most notable has been the widely accepted view that a break in
custody terminates the Edwards presumption. Commentators also have attempted to
characterize the types of events which should affect the duration of the Edwards
prohibition. The discussion of the issue usually has involved a kind of wholesale or
generic characterization of these events and an examination of how each category
might be viewed in the context of the Edwards doctrine."
This process has been helpful, and events such as an interruption in custody, the
passage of time, and the disposition of the matter originally under investigation have
been explored. While prompted by a doctrine which regards the presumption of
Edwards as irrebuttable and by the consequent question of whether or when its
prophylaxis might end, it sometimes seems that this wholesale categorization" of
intervening events misses the mark in attempting to address the real concerns
underlying Edwards. Wholesale generalizations about the types of events which might
render Edwards' protections inapplicable can lead to unwarranted assumptions and
anomalous results. Edwards rests upon the presumption of a suspect's helplessness,
and the process of relying upon generic conclusions about a particular type of
intervening circumstance often seems to neglect a very real need for a more
particularized inquiry as to how an event specifically bears upon a suspect's articulated
need for an attorney during custodial interrogation.
All of this suggests that it might be useful to explore the issue of whether the
importation of Miranda's "conclusive presumption" analysis into the realm of
Edwards' second tier of protections is appropriate. With regard to the nature of
conclusive and rebuttable presumptions in general, Professors Stephen Schulhofer and
David Strauss have suggested that they are not as different in kind as is often

469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984) (per curiam).
10. See Laurie Magid, Questioning the Question-ProofInmate: Defining Miranda Custody for
IncarceratedSuspects, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 883, 932 (1997); Marcy Strauss, Reinterrogation,22 HASTINGS
CONsT. L.Q. 359, 386-92 (1995) [hereinafter Strauss, Reinterrogation];Elizabeth E. Levy, Note, NonContinuous Custody and the Miranda-EdwardsRule: Break in Custody Severs Safeguards,20 NEw ENG.
J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 539, 556 (1994).
11. This description has long been used by Professor Gerald Gunther to characterize the Supreme
Court's evaluation of entire categories of speech for the purpose of determining whether they warrant full
protection under the First Amendment. See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1078 (1997).
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believed. While their view is not uncontroversial,' 3 the further possibility that the
Edwards presumption might be recast as rebuttable is intriguing. It is quite possible
that Edwards' conclusive presumption was not mandated by the same imperatives as
was Miranda's, and that a rebuttable presumption would be more suited to the
advancement of the goals of Edwards.
A major challenge accompanying any modification of Edwards' prophylaxis of
course would be the articulation of a standard that truly has teeth. Any rule must be
difficult to thwart and must be manageable both in the interrogation room and in
court. Under a modified approach, Edwards' presumption that a suspect continues to
perceive himself to be "unable to proceed without a lawyer's advice"'4 may be
regarded as exceedingly strong, yet still rebuttable by evidence of special circumstances, known at the time of the reinterrogation, which compel the conclusion that the
assumptions flowing from the suspect's request for a lawyer are no longer applicable.
While an approach regarding Edwards' presumption as rebuttable is likely to yield a
number of definite conclusions concerning some specific types of events which would
permit reinterrogation, it would arrive at these conclusions by a route more suited to
the evaluation of the variety of circumstances which might occur than does the current
effort to anticipate and categorize those events. Moreover, this approach need not
degenerate into the kind of amorphous "totality of the circumstances" approach that
the Court has always eschewed in the area.' 5 The application of the presumption, a
high standard for its rebuttal - applied rigorously - and perhaps even the
designation of types of events which may not be considered, can prevent uncertainty.
The Evolution of the Edwards Presumption
The Edwards doctrine developed gradually. Edwards itself did not speak in terms
of a presumption. Rather, the Court addressed the significance of a suspect's request
for counsel in the context of evaluating the sufficiency of traditional waiver analysis.
In fact, events in Edwards might well have presented an occasion for the Court to
discuss whether the suspect had sufficiently invoked his right to the presence of
counsel before any further interrogation. Nevertheless, both the lower court and the
Supreme Court treated the assertion of the right as sufficient.'6
Edwards, a murder arrestee who had initially agreed to custodial interrogation at a
police station, was informed of his Mirandarights and asserted an alibi defense after
being told that he had been implicated by another suspect. He then sought to "make
a deal" and was afforded an opportunity to speak with a prosecuting attorney on the

12. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, ReconsideringMiranda,54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 450 (1987); David
A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of ProphylacticRules, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 190, 192 (1988) [hereinafter Strauss,
ProphylacticRules].
13. See Joseph D. Grano, Miranda's ConstitutionalDifficulties: A Reply to ProfessorSchulhqfer,
55 U. CHI. L. REV. 174, 179 (1988) [hereinafter Grano, Miranda].
14. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 683.
15. Id. (comparing and rejecting application of the standard of Michigan v. Mosley, which required
that police "scrupulously honor" suspect's assertion of right to silence).
16. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 487 (1981).
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telephone. After a few minutes, Edwards hung up and said, "I want an attorney before
making a deal." Questioning then ceased and Edwards was taken to the county jail.17
The next morning, two different detectives arrived at the jail and asked to speak with
Edwards. Edwards was so informed, and he replied that he did not wish to talk to
anyone. Told that he had no choice and again informed of his Miranda rights,
Edwards relented, spoke with the officers, and incriminated himself after hearing the
taped statement of the individual who had implicated him." His confession was
admitted at trial, and on appeal of his conviction the Arizona Supreme Court held that
Edwards' assertion at the police station of both his right to remain silent and his right
to counsel were sufficiently clear, but that both rights were waived during the
jailhouse exchange."
The U.S. Supreme Court focused upon the insufficiency of the state court's standard
for evaluating waiver, underlining the fact that it must be not only voluntary, but that
it must also comport with the familiar standard of Johnson v. Zerbst," constituting
"a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege."'" The Court then went on to emphasize the need for additional safeguards
when the accused has invoked his right to the presence of counsel during custodial
interrogation. It noted that Miranda treated the assertion of the right to counsel as
significant and stated that "the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present."'
The Court held:
[W]hen an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during
custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established
by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial
interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. We further hold
that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with
the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by
authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the
accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.'
Chief Justice Burger, concurring in the judgment, described this requirement as a
"special rule as to how an accused in custody may waive the right to be free from
custodial interrogation."'

17. See id. at 478-79.
18. See iL at 479.
19. See id.at 480.
20. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
21. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482 (quoting Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464).
22. Id. at 485 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966)).
23. Id. at 484-85 (footnote omitted). The Court added in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975),
where it had held that a suspect's invocation of the right to silence must be "scrupulously honored," that
it had recognized Miranda's distinction between "the procedural safeguards triggered by a request to
remain silent and a request for an attorney and had required that interrogation cease until an attorney was
present only if the individual stated that he wanted counsel." Edwards,451 U.S. at 485 (citing Mosley,
423 U.S. at 104 n.10).
24. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 487 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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Elaboration of the policy underlying Edwards was left for later cases. Arizona v.
Roberson,' decided seven years later, is one of the most interesting, for it both
articulated the rationale for Edwards and provided the basis for expanding its reach
to foreclose reinterrogation by law enforcement authorities from other jurisdictions.
The opinion began with the modest statement that the Court was declining Arizona's
request that it "craft an exception to [the Edwards] rule for cases in which the police
want to interrogate a suspect about an offense that is unrelated to the subject of their
initial interrogation."' While the Arizona courts had agreed with this conclusion, the
Court noted that it granted certiorari to resolve a conflict with decisions of other state
courts,27 including one holding Edwards inapplicable to an interrogation on an
unrelated matter by authorities from a different state z'
Roberson, arrested at a burglary scene, was informed of his Miranda rights and
stated that he "wanted a lawyer before answering any questions."29 Three days later,
while he was still in custody, Roberson was questioned about a different burglary by
another officer who was unaware that he had previously asserted his rights. Again, he
was advised of his Miranda rights and then incriminated himself.3 Pursuant to
Edwards,the incriminating statement was suppressed at trial and the suppression order
was affirmed on appeal.3?' When Roberson reached the Supreme Court, the Court
noted that a primary purpose of Miranda was "to give concrete constitutional
guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow,"3 and reiterated that
"[oine of the principal advantages of Miranda is the ease and clarity of its application."3 As to Edwards' reinterrogation standard, it added:
[T]he prophylactic protections that the Miranda warnings provide to
counteract the "inherently compelling pressures" of custodial interrogation
and to "permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against selfincrimination," are implemented by the application of the Edwards
corollary that if a suspect believes that he is not capable of undergoing
such questioning without advice of counsel, then it is presumed that any
subsequent waiver that has come at the authorities' behest, and not at the
suspect's own instigation, is itself the product of the "inherently compelling pressures" and not the purely voluntary choice of the suspect. As
Justice WHITE has explained, "the accused having expressed his own
view that he is not competent to deal with the authorities without legal

25. 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
26. Id. at 678-79.

27. See id. at 679.
28. See id. at 679 n.3 (citing State v. Dampier, 333 S.E.2d 230 (N.C. 1985)).
29. Id. at 678.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 678-79. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression and the Arizona
Supreme Court denied a petition for review. See id.
32. Id. at 680 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1966)).
33. Id. at 680 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 425 (1986)). ,
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advice, a later decision at the authorities' insistence to make a statement
without counsel's presence may properly be viewed with skepticism."'
The Court went on to praise the "bright-line, prophylactic" quality of the Edwards
rule, observing that the explanation it offered in 1979 for the "per se aspect of
Miranda"was applicable here?5
IT]he "relatively rigid requirement that interrogation must cease upon the
accused's request for an attorney ... has the virtue of informing police
and prosecutors with specificity as to what they may do in conducting
custodial interrogation, and of informing courts under what circumstances
statements obtained during such interrogation are not admissible. This
gain in specificity, which benefits the accused and the State alike, has
been thought to outweigh the burdens that the decision in Miranda
imposes on law enforcement agencies and the courts ... ."'
The Court also noted specifically that "whether the same or different law enforcement
authorities are involved in the second investigation, the same need to determine
whether the suspect has requested counsel exists."3"
Since Roberson, the Court's approach to the rule in Edwards most accurately can
be characterized as one imposing a presumption that is irrebuttable. This is clearly
reflected in the dissent of Justice Sclia in Minnick v. Mississippi.3 In Minnick, the

Court considered the question of "whether Edwards' protection ceases once the suspect
has consulted with an attorney,"39 and concluded that the "protection of Edwards is
not terminated or suspended" by such consultation. 4 Minnick had spoken with his
attorney on two or three occasions, after having asserted his Mirandaright to counsel
during a double murder investigation by FBI agents. Questioning was resumed by
state officials after Minnick's legal consultations, and Minnick's responses to this
second round of questioning were admitted at his state trial' On appeal following
conviction, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the Edwards reinitiation
requirement was inapplicable, since counsel had been made available 42 The U.S.
Supreme Court rejected this conclusion and emphasized the importance of counsel
during interrogation.

34. Id. at 681 (citations omitted).
35. Id. at 682.
36. Id. at 681-82 (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979)). The Court added that the
applicability of the "per se" aspect of Miranda to the Edwards doctrine was significant, as the former
was "based on the unique role the lawyer plays in the adversary system of criminal justice in this
country." Id. at 682 n.4 (quoting Fare, 442 U.S. at 719).
37. Id. at 687-88. In dissent, Justice Kennedy noted that the Court's rule "will bar law enforcement
officials, even those from some other city or other jurisdiction, from questioning a suspect about an
unrelated matter." Id. at 689 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
38. 498 U.S. 146 (1990).
39. Id. at 147.
40. Id. at 150.

41. See id. at 148-49.
42. See id. at 149-50.
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In our view, a fair reading of Edwards and subsequent cases demonstrates
that we have interpreted the rule to bar police-initiated interrogation unless
the accused has counsel with him at the time of questioning. Whatever
the ambiguities of our earlier cases on this point, we now hold that when
counsel is requested, interrogation must cease, and officials may not
reinitiate interrogation without counsel present, whether or not the accused
has consulted with his attorney.43
Justice Kennedy, a dissenter in Roberson, took the occasion on behalf of the Court to
reaffirm Edwards' goal of preventing the police from badgering a defendant, and
'
to praise "the clarity of its command and the certainty of its application."45
He noted
that a single consultation with an attorney does not insulate a suspect from badgering,
and that consultation is not always effective in informing a suspect of his rights.
The difficulties in evaluating the scope and quality of consultation with counsel
without interfering with the attorney-client privilege were also evident to the Court.47
Justice Scalia, in dissent, characterized the opinion as "establish[ing] an irrebuttable
presumption that a criminal suspect, after invoking his Miranda right to counsel, can
never validly waive that right during any police-initiated encounter, even after the
suspect has been provided multiple Mirandawarnings and has actually consulted his
attorney."" For Justice Scalia, the issue was whether the irrebuttable presumption of
Edwards should continue 9 His conclusion was that the Edwards rule should cease
to apply after the first consultation, because the presumption that a "confession is the
result of ignorance of rights" or coercion would then have "no genuine basis in
fact."' Justice Scalia characterized the Edwards prohibition as perpetual, adding:
"Perpetuality" is not too strong a term, since, although the Court rejects
one logical moment at which the Edwards presumption might end, it
suggests no alternative. In this case Minnick was reapproached by the
police three days after he requested counsel, but the result would
presumably be the same if it had been three months, or three years, or
even three decades. This perpetual irrebuttable presumption will apply, I

43. Id. at 153.
44. See id. at 150 (citing Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990)).
45. Id. at 151.

46. See id. at 153-54.
47. See id. at 155. The Court also noted:
Added to these difficulties in definition and application of the proposed rule is our

concern over its consequence that the suspect whose counsel is prompt would lose the
protection of Edwards,while the one whose counsel is dilatory would not. There is more
than irony to this result. There is a strong possibility that it would distort the proper
conception of the attorney's duty to the client and set us on a course at odds with what
ought to be effective representation.

Id.
48. Id. at 156 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Chief Justice Rehnquistjoined in the dissent.

49. See id. at 161.
50. Id. at 162.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2000

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:11

might add, not merely to interrogations involving the original crime, but
to those involving other subjects as well.'
It seems clear that, as a consequence of the irrebuttable nature of Edwards'
presumption, the implementation of the very legitimate concerns stemming from a
suspect's expression of potential helplessness has become a problematic all-or-nothing
issue. When the presumption flowing from a request for counsel is applicable, the rule
of Edwards is given full sway, constituting a prophylaxis "with a vengeance.""2
Under this approach, the benefits of clarity and ease of application certainly are clear.
The costs are also significant, however, and they threaten to undermine the goals of
Edwards itself. Where courts are willing, with or without sufficient doctrinal
justification, to see this powerful and irrebuttable presumption as no longer
applicable - as in the "break in custody" cases - the question of who reinitiates
interrogation, so telling and conclusive under Edwards, fades into relative obscurity. 3
Perhaps more alarmingly, the breathtaking scope of the Edwards presumption,
extending to questioning by other jurisdictions, encompassing the discussion of
unrelated matters, and possessing no articulated durational limitation, threatens to
pressure courts to discharge the mandate of Edwards in a begrudging and potentially
undermining manner. A defendant may be more likely to be seen as having
insufficiently invoked his right to counsel during custodial interrogation. One wonders
how Edwards' own invocation might be evaluated today were it to arise in the context
of assessing a reinterrogation by an oblivious officer from another state, years later,
about another matter. Resolution of the issue of whether a suspect has reinitiated a
conversation might likewise be influenced.' The broad brush and indelible ink with
which Edwards is now implemented are not without their problems.
The Litigation in United States v. Green
In 1992, United States v. Green55 presented the Court with an opportunity to
address the question of when the Edwards presumption might terminate. In early
1993, the death of the defendant brought an abrupt halt to the litigation, but only after
the Court had heard oral argument in the case. That oral argument provides a
revealing indication of the Court's concerns at the time.
Lowell Green was arrested on July 18, 1989, and charged with the possession of
a controlled substance with intent to distribute. When presented with a consent form,
he noted in writing that he was not willing to answer questions without an attorney
present. No interrogation occurred." Before his indictment, he was remanded to
51. Id.at 163 (citation omitted).
52. Dissenting in Miranda,Justice Harlan described its goals as the seeking of voluntariness "with
a vengeance." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436. 505 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The phrase seems
suitable to describe the operation of the Edwards prophylaxis.
53. This fact would of course continue to be relevant to traditional waiver analysis.
54. See Strauss, Reinterrogation,supra note 10, at 400.
55. 592 A.2d 985 (D.C. 1991), cert. granted, 504 U.S. 908 (1992), cert. dismissed, 507 U.S. 545
(1993).
56. See id, at 985.
57. While not specifically noted in the opinion of the court of appeals, the questioning ceased. See
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the custody of juvenile authorities in connection with an unrelated matter. An attorney
had been appointed to represent him at an initial arraignment on the drug charge,"
and on September 27, 1987 he pleaded guilty in the case to a lesser included drug
offense. 9 He remained in juvenile custody when, before his sentencing, he was
booked on an unrelated murder warrant. At that booking, on January 5, 1990, he was
advised of his Mirandarights and indicated on a written form that he was willing to
waive them. After some discussion of his involvement in the murder, Green again was
advised of his rights and agreed to make a videotaped statement. On tape, he
confessed to his involvement in the murder.w
Green was indicted for first degree murder, and his motion to suppress the
statement was initially denied on the basis of several factors. The trial court noted that
five months had elapsed after Green's invocation of his Mirandarights, that the later
portion of his custody had occurred in the less coercive environment of a youth
facility, and that Green had had several opportunities to confer with counsel.'
Minnick was decided shortly afterwards, and the trial court then reversed its ruling,
since Green's opportunities to confer with appointed counsel had been the most
significant ground for its initial decision.'
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression of Green's
statement.' The court discussed the government's effort to distinguish Edwards,
Roberson and Minnick based upon the "sheer length of time" between Green's
assertion of the right to counsel and the questioning.' It noted that "to the extent
Edwards is 'designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his
previously asserted Miranda rights,' . . . that danger is reduced when the police have
made no effort to interrogate the defendant for more than five months."' While the
court characterized this as a substantial argument, it assumed that the defendant's
only contact with investigators and prosecutors was through his attorney or in the
attorney's presence. Consequently, it noted that "there is nothing in the lapse of time
itself from which to deduce that his original belief in his vulnerability to the pressures
of custodial interrogation had diminished."'67
The court recalled the Supreme Court's insistence that the Edwards rule be kept
"clear and unequivocal," and asked, "[a]t what point in time - and in conjunction

id. at 985; Respondents Brief at 2, United States v. Green, 592 A.2d 985 (D.C. 1991) (No. 91-1521).
58. See Green, 592 A.2d at 985. The drug charge was initially dismissed at a preliminary hearing
but was reinstated. See id. at 985-86.

59. See id. at 986.
60. See id. He also confessed to robbing the victim. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 985.
64. Id. at 988.
65. Id. (quoting Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146. 150 (1990)).
66. See id. The court also observed that while Green had been held in the "presumably less coercive
environment" of a youth facility, the govemment's concession that Green had been in "continuous
custody for purposes of the Edwards prophylactic rule," id. at 988-89, "relinquish[ed] any argument
based upon differing degrees of coerciveness in the custodial environment." Id. at 989 n.5.
67. Id. at 989.
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with what other circumstances - does it make doctrinal sense to treat the defendant's
invocation of his right to counsel as countermanded without any initiating activity on
his part?"' It added, "[u]Itimately, given its emphasis on the need for a bright line
rule in this area, we think only the Supreme Court can explain whether the Edwards
rule is time-tethered. ' Responding to the government's argument that defendant's
counseled guilty plea to the drug offense constituted a "break in events sufficient to
sever any link" between defendant's assertion of his Miranda right to counsel and
interrogation about the unrelated murder, the court stated that it "must decide whether
by pleading guilty in the drug case defendant can be said to have 'reopened the
dialogue with the authorities' within the meaning of Edwards." Thus framing the
issue in terms of whether the plea constituted the defendant's reinitiation under
Edwards, the court noted that the defendant had pleaded guilty with the assistance and
advice of counsel. Although the plea presumably demonstrated personal acceptance
of responsibility, it was consistent with his original decision to deal with the
government officials through an attorney." Counsel's negotiation of a plea to a lesser
charge "would only have confirmed the wisdom of his choice to insist on the shield
of legal representation."' The plea could not, therefore, be regarded as a prelude to
a waiver constituting an "initial election by the accused to deal with the authorities on
his own."'
In the arguments before the Supreme Court, the government emphasized the fact
that a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination, ' noting both that a plea initiated a change in the accused's status7 and
that a suspect who has so waived his privilege "is unlikely to feel badgered if the
police subsequently approach him, repeat the Mirandawarnings, and seek to question
him about an unrelated offense."'76 At oral argument, questioning by the Court of the
Deputy Solicitor General focused on the fact that Green had not yet been sentenced,
and that he may have experienced coercive pressures. 7 The issue of how the Court
might approach the possible termination of the Edwards presumption was addressed
as follows:

68. Id.
69. Id. The court also cited the importance of a defendant's continuous custody in reaching this
decision. See id.
70. Id. at 990 (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 486 n.9 (1981)).

71. See id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 991. The dissent maintained that, with the guilty plea, the circumstances had so changed
"that any coercive effect must be deemed to have been dissipated." Id. at 992 (Steadman, J.,
dissenting).
74. See Petitioner's Brief at 15, United States v. Green, 504 U.S. 908 (1992) (No. 91-1521).

75. See id. at 17.
76. Id. at 8,25. For additional discussion of the government's arguments, see Jeffrey E.Richardson,
Note, It's Not Easy Being Green, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 145, 156-58 (1993).
77. See Oral Arg. at 8, 12-13, United States v. Green, 504 U.S. 908 (1992) (No. 91-1521).
Attributions of comments to individual Justices are set forth at 52 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3096 (Nov. 30,
1992) and 61 U.S.L.W. 3453 (Jan. 5, 1993). The texts of these comments vary substantially from the
official transcript.
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QUESTION: Do you agree that there should be some bright line test
for any cutoff of the duration of the Edwards rule?
MR. ROBERTS: No, Your Honor, I don't think that the brightness of
the line is absolutely paramount to all other factors. The guilty QUESTION: You'd have us apply a totality of the circumstances test?
MR. ROBERTS: I don't think it goes that far. The dichotomy between
the clear Edwards rule and our proposal today I think is a very false one.
When the Court applies Edwards today, it looks at the circumstances of
each case. It has to look to see if the individual is in custody. It has to
look to see if what he has done amounts to an invocation of his right to
counsel. It has to look to see whether or not he has waived that invocation by subsequent initiation. It has to look to see whether or not
what the police are doing is interrogation, and although this Court hasn't
decided it yet, we think they have to look to see to make sure he has been
continuously in custody.7
This discussion was followed by a colloquy illustrating the difficulties of line drawing
with the passage of time. In turn, defense counsel was examined about the
perpetuality of the Edwards' rule:
MR. CONTE [Responding to the question of whether sentencing might
terminate Edwards' protection]: After sentencing, I think you would have
that assurance. I think the person is in a much different psychological
state of mind after sentencing.
QUESTION: So you don't - you say Edwards wouldn't last forever,
but after sentencing?
MR. CONTE: I still think it should last forever, but after sentencing
would certainly be a better break if this Court was going to end it than it
would be after a plea and before sentencing.
QUESTION: Nothing lasts forever, Mr. Conte.
(Laughter.)

78. Oral Arg. at 10-11, Green (No. 91-1521).
79. A question, later attributed to Justice White, was posed as to whether Edwards "just wears out."
Id. at 16; see 52 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3097 (Nov. 30, 1992). The following then occurred:

QUESTION: Well, it isn't clear to me what you would say. Suppose he had remained
in custody and it had been 3 months and the police hadn't asked him anything and no
guilty plea. Now, is that enough?
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, it is, and QUESTION: 2 months?
MR. ROBERTS: 2 months is enough and QUESTION: I month?
MR. ROBERTS: I month is enough.
QUESTION: 2 days?
MR. ROBERTS: 2 days is probably not enough. Now, it isn't a bright line.
QUESTION: It isn't even a line, is it?
Oral Arg. at 17-18, Green (No. 91-1521). The first four indented questions are attributed to Justice
O'Connor at 52 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3097 (Nov. 30, 1992).
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MR. CONTE: That's true, Your Honor.'
The suggestion that a totality of the circumstances test constitutes an alternative to
a bright line approach is telling. It reflects the problem posed by the casting of the
Edwardspresumption as conclusive, while it also seems evident that it should not last
forever. Under the current framework, the "rigid"'" rule of Edwards (derived from
the "rigid"' rule of Miranda requiring the cessation of questioning upon a request
for counsel) invites the Court to consider each specific circumstance as a distinct point
at which the irrebuttable presumption no longer applies. It is clear from the oral
argument in Green that the Court might instead consider the possibility of a vague
totality of the circumstances approach to the question of when the presumption ends.
This approach could have a substantial and unacceptable institutional cost, sacrificing
too much of the focus which is important for Edwards' implementation by law
enforcement authorities!' A view that regards the Edwards presumption as rebuttable
might provide an alternative.
Intervening Circumstances: Discussions Thus Far
As government counsel observed during oral argument in Green, the Supreme Court
has never held that a break in custody terminates the presumptioh of Edwards."
Rather, a fleeting reference to contnuous custody in dictum in McNeil v. Wisconsin s
is sometimes cited as an indication of the Court's view of the issue. The Court's
statement there provides a tenuous basis for such a significant conclusion. In McNeil,
the Court expressly held that the defendant's right to counsel under Miranda was not
at all implicated. The defendant had invoked his Sixth Amendment right to counsel
at an initial appearance on a charge of armed robbery, when he was represented by
an appointed attorney. Afterwards, while in custody, McNeil was questioned several
times about an unrelated homicide. He signed a waiver form at each session and
incriminated himself. After he was charged with the murder and related offenses,
McNeil moved to suppress his statements on the ground that his courtroom appearance
constituted an invocation of his Mirandaright to counsel and that his waivers during
the police-initiated interrogation sessions were invalid!"
The Court rejected his argument. Noting that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
is offense-specific and would not bar police-initiated reinterrogation on an unrelated
crime n it held that McNeil's invocation of the right to counsel at his judicial

80. Oral Arg. at 29-30, Green (No. 91-1521).
81. See Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 (1984) (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719
(1979)); see infra note 116 and accompanying text.
82. See Fare,442 U.S. at 719.

83. Such tests often provide little guidance as to how relevant factors are to be weighed, or indeed,
which factors are most significant.
84. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
85. 501 U.S. 171 (1991).
86. See id. at 173-74.
87. See id. at 175-76.
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appearance did not constitute an invocation of the non-offense-specific MirandaEdwards right.' When characterizing Edwards, the Court stated:
In Edwards... we established a second layer of prophylaxis for the
Mirandaright to counsel: Once a suspect asserts the right, not only must
the current interrogation cease, but he may not be approached for further
interrogation "until counsel has been made available to him," [Edwards]
which means, we have most recently held, that counsel must be present
[Minnick]. If the police do subsequently initiate an encounter in the

absence of counsel (assuming there has been no break in custody), the
suspect's statements are presumed involuntary and therefore inadmissible
at trial, even where the suspect executes a waiver and his statements
would be considered voluntary under traditional standards.'
Six federal circuits 9° and more than a dozen state courts?' have embraced a rule
terminating the Edwards presumption when there has been a break in custody. Many
of these cases predate McNeil, and citation by others to the above-quoted parenthetical' adds little to the evaluation of the matter. The Supreme Court's McNeil
"assumption," noted in dictum for the purpose of broadly stating the Edwardsrule, did
not discuss specific policy considerations flowing from a break in custody, nor did it

88. See id. at 177-78. The Court observed that the purposes of the guarantees are different. While
the purpose of the Sixth Amendment right is "to 'protec[t] the unaided layman at critical confrontations'
with his 'expert adversary" after positions have solidified with respect to a particular offense, id.,(quoting
United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984)), the Miranda-Edwardsrule was designed to protect
"the suspect's 'desire to deal with the police only through counsel,'" McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178 (quoting
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981)). As the Edwards rule relates not only to custodial
interrogation, but also extends to any crime, regardless of whether an "adversarial relationship" has
arisen, "(tio invoke the Sixth Amendment interest is, as a matter of fact, not to invoke the MirandaEdwards interest." McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178 (emphasis added). The Court added that invocation of the
Fifth Amendment right requires a statement that can "reasonably be construed to be an expression of a
desire for the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogationby the police." Id.
(emphasis added). It also noted that it had never held that Mirandarights can be invoked anticipatorily,
outside of the context of custodial interrogation. See id. at 182 n.3.
89. Id. at 176-77.
90. See Kyger v. Carlton, 146 F.3d 374, 380-81 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Barlow, 41 F.3d
935, 945-46 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255, 257 (9th Cir. 1992); Dunkins v.
Thigpen, 854 F.2d 394, 397 (11th Cir. 1988); McFadden v. Garraghty, 820 F.2d 654, 661 (4th Cir.
1987); United States ex rel. Espinoza v. Fairman, 813 F.2d 117, 125-26 (7th Cir. 1987) (dictum); United
States v. Skinner, 667 F.2d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir. 1982); see also United States v. Vaughters, 44 MJ. 377,
379 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
91. See, e.g., In re Bonnie H., 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 513, 526 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); People v. Trujillo,
773 P.2d 1086, 1092 (Colo. 1989); Keys v. State, 606 So. 2d 669, 672 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1992); State
v. Bymes, 375 S.E.2d 41, 42 (Ga. 1989); In re Wells, 532 So. 2d 191, 197 (La. Ct. App. 1988);
Commonwealth v. Galford, 597 N.E.2d 410, 414 (Mass. 1992); Willie v. State, 585 So. 2d 660, 666
(Miss. 1991) (dictum); Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 688 A.2d 710, 712-13 (Pa. Super. 1997); State v.
Kyger, 787 S.W.2d 13, 25 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989); see also Levy, supra note 10. For the view that
all continuous incarceration should not be viewed as continuous custody for Miranda purposes, see
Magid, supra note 10.
92. See Vaughters, 44 MJ. at 379; Keys, 606 So. 2d at 672; Wyatt, 688 A.2d at 713.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2000

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:11

indicate what sort of break might make a difference. The propriety of attaching
significance to a break in custody that would entirely terminate the Edwards
presumption must be examined in light of the logic of Edwards itself.
Indeed, some of the early and most frequently cited cases in the area reflect the
notion that a break in custody is determinative because it gives a suspect an
opportunity to consult with an attorney - a view that has since been undermined by
Minnick. The Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Dunkins v. Thigpen93 provides such an
example. Noting that a break in custody "dissolves" a defendant's Edwards claim, the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit added, "If the police release the defendant,
and if the defendant has a reasonable opportunity to contact his attorney, then we see
'4
no reason why Edwards should bar the admission of any subsequent statements. 1
By itself, this discredited rationale would not be important, were it not for its
reappearance in some post-Minnick opinions."
Far more often, the courts' acceptance of a "break in custody" dissolution of
Edwards' protection is unadorned by any extensive effort to articulate a rationale. Of
those mentioned, most frequently stated is the observation that a release from custody
simply terminates coercive pressures.' Precisely why this is assumed to be true even
after a resumption of custody is an issue that is left unexplored, suggesting that courts
are eager to find some limit to Edwards. The break in custody rule has been applied
to a release for a period as short as one day' and as long as approximately fifteen
months," without apparent distinction." The rule at times has also been accompanied by the observation that a suspect's release from custody must not constitute a
mere contrivance or pretext to permit reinterrogation.'" The cases are devoid of any
suggestions as to the standard to be applied in divining whether a pretextual motive
underlies a break in custody, absent an outright admission by authorities. If judicial
efforts under the Fourth Amendment to monitor "pretextual" traffic stops before
Whren v. United States'"' are any indication, this issue would certainly be a difficult
one to explore.'" Citing the need for clarity on this matter, Professor Marcy Strauss

93. 854 F.2d 394 (11th Cir. 1988).
94. Id. at 397; see also Skinner, 667 F.2d at 1309.
95. See Vaughters, 44 MJ. at 379. The court stated that, even after Minnick, it "continue[d] to be
persuaded that Edwards and its progeny did not intend to preclude further interrogation by police where
a suspect has been provided ... 'real opportunity to seek legal advice.'" ,d, (quoting United States v.
Schake, 30 M.J. 314, 319 (C.A.A.F. 1990)); see also Wyatt, 688 A.2d at 713.
96. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Espinoza v. Fairman, 813 F.2d 117, 125 (7th Cir. 1987); Bonnie
H., 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 526; Trujillo, 773 P.2d at 1092.
97. See generally United States v. Skinner, 667 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1982).
98. See generally State v. Bymes, 375 S.E.2d 41 (Ga. 1989).
99. See United States v. Vaughters, 44 M.J. 377, 378 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (noting 19 days); People
v. Trujillo, 773 P.2d 1086, 1092 (Colo. 1989) (noting seven weeks); In re Wells, 532 So. 2d 191, 193
(La. Ct. App. 1988) (noting 45 days).
100. See, e.g., Bonnie H., 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 525; Trujillo, 773 P.2d at 1092.
101. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
102. Before Whren, it had been assumed by some that the Fourth Amendment prohibited a
pretextual traffic stop, where an officer was motivated by a desire to search for evidence of another
offense. See generally Ed Aro, Note, The Pretext Problem Revisited: A Doctrinal Exploration of Bad
Faithin Search and Seizure Cases, 70 B.U. L. REv. 111 (1990). Whren held an officer's ulterior motives
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has also correctly criticized the approach which terminates Edwards' protection upon
any break in custody as ill-suited to serve the rule's potential justifications." She has
noted that release does not necessarily dissipate any initial coercion, and even may,
under some circumstances, enhance the coercive effect of custody through the
intimidating process of reapprehension "4 It is also striking that those courts which
employ a break in custody approach seldom discuss, or even acknowledge, the
potential effect of coercive influences after custody is resumed.
The passage of time, another circumstance potentially affecting the duration of the
Edwards presumption, was expressly discussed during the Green litigation. This issue
remains open and the Court might well modify the current doctrine. Such a
modification would of course require the generalization that, in fact, a protected
suspect's need is not a "perpetual" one - to use Justice Scalia's term" - and that
at a certain point one should conclude that it is likely that the helplessness manifested
by an initial request for counsel is absent. As the duration involved lengthens, debate
about the influence of time upon a suspect's helplessness is likely to decrease, and the
possibility of a suspect's change of heart may seem significant to the Court. Any
perception that judicial line-drawing is arbitrary is also likely to fade if this point is
marked at two or three years, rather than two or three months."'1 As suggested by
the litigation in Green, the "time-tethering""" of Edwards' irrebuttable presumption
may be inevitable when a truly lengthy period has elapsed.
As Green also illustrates, a number of difficulties will surround any effort to
characterize a procedural development with regard to the prosecution of the case
originally under investigation as an event that should end Edwards'protection. Despite
the possibility that a variety of events might be portrayed as constituting the
conclusive disposition of a proceeding," few in fact qualify. The expiration of a
statute of limitations or the applicability of a constitutional bar to a prosecution" are
rare. Even under those circumstances, it does not necessarily follow that the nonoffense-specific Edwards presumption should automatically terminate without some
factual basis for concluding that a suspect's expressed needs have changed with regard
to subsequent custodial interrogation."'

to be irrelevant when the stop is supported by probable cause. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 811.
103. See Strauss, Reinterrogation, supra note 10, at 386-92. She would, however, endorse the
termination of Edwards'protections if six months or more has transpired since the suspect's release. See
id. at 401-02.

at 389-90.
104. See i&t
105. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
108. Professor Strauss has observed that "[t]he end of an offense might be defined in many ways;
it could include the government's decision to drop charges, the expiration of the statute of limitations,
conviction for the offense, or sentencing." Strauss, Reinterrogation,supra note 10, at 392.
109. Examples would include situations where the right to a speedy trial, double jeopardy or due
process forecloses prosecution.
110. Cf. Strauss, Reinterrogation,supranote 10, at 393 (noting that a guilty plea does not have this

inevitable effect).
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Efforts to characterize other nondispositive events as in fact manifesting a change
of perception by a represented defendant are on an even weaker footing. In Green,
the government's argument that the guilty plea constituted a relinquishment of the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination was met by the court of appeals'
conclusion that the plea "was consistent with [Green's] original election to deal with
government officials only through an attorney."' At the subsequent oral argument
before the Court, it was suggested by a question that sentencing upon the initial charge
would furnish an appropriate point for the expiration of the Edwards presumption." 2
Once again, this question seems to reflect a potential judicial view, manifested
elsewhere during the argument, that there should be some limitation upon the Edwards
rule. But the grounding of such a conclusion in the logic of the Edwards presumption
has yet to be developed.
The discussion of intervening events which may affect the duration of Edwards'
irrebuttable presumption at times has thus been marked by abstract, overbroad, or
unexplained generalizations about their effects. The conclusiveness of the presumption
and the consequent framing of the question of whether the presumption might
inevitably have a "termination" point caused by a particular type of event have played
no small role in shaping the discourse. Whether the conclusiveness of the presumption
is really necessary for the adequate implementation of the goals of Edwards is a
question worth asking.
The Suitability of Edwards' Conclusive Presumption
The evolution of our way of thinking about Edwards has been the product of our
way of thinking about the rules of Miranda. Those rules were adopted in response
to the deficiencies of the due process involuntariness standard, which failed to give
police, prosecutors, and the courts adequate guidance for its implementation."'
The bright line qualities of the Miranda rules, including the mandate that
interrogation must cease upon a suspect's request for a lawyer, were designed to
provide needed specificity for the preservation of Fifth Amendment rights.""
Edwards itself linked its policies to the latter requirement,"5 and in Smith v.
Illinois"6 the Court traced the prophylactic nature of the Edwards rule to Miranda's approach."' The casting of Edwards as incorporating an irrebuttable

111. United States v. Green, 592 A.2d 985, 990 (D.C. 1991); see aLso supra note 71 and
accompanying text.
112. "QUESTION: Well, I would have thought that the Edwards rule might expire at some point,
certainly after he is sentenced after the drug charge." Oral Arg. at 25-26, United States v. Green, 504
U.S. 908 (1992) (No. 91-1521).
113. See generally Wayne R. LaFave, Constitutional Rules for Police: A Matter of Style, 41
SYRACUSE L. REV. 849, 873 (1990); Magid, supra note 10, at 917; Paul Marcus, A Return to the "Bright
Line Rule" of Miranda, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 93, 111-12 (1993); Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving
Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 109, 113 (1998).
114. See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681-82 (1988); supra note 36 and accompanying text.
115. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981); supra note 22 and accompanying text.
116. 469 U.S. 91 (1984).
117. An accused in custody, "having expressed... his desire to deal with the police only through
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presumption similarly parallels the evolution of the doctrine of Miranda as one in
which, in the absence of its required warnings, an irrebuttable "presumption of
compulsion" is created.' As is so evident from Edwards, Roberson, and Minnick,
this importation of Miranda'sapproach has been the result of the Court's conviction
that Mirandahas provided an effective methodology for dealing with the problems
of custodial interrogation. The questions which have evolved under Edwards now
suggest the need for a fresh look at the suitability of imposing a conclusive
presumption in the Edwards context.
An examination of the dynamics which were evident in the Green litigation may
provide a starting point. Focusing upon the potential issues which it presented,
Professor George Dix has aptly characterized them as examples of the possible
incorporation of "case-specific considerations" into a prophylactic rule "in order to
avoid absurd results.""' 9 He has also added that some advantages of the prophylactic rule might thereby have been sacrificed and that, in such a situation, "there is an
increased risk that the incorporated qualifications will multiply until so-called
prophylactic rules become indistinguishable from others."'" The pressures in
Green which could have prompted the modification of Edwards'prophylaxis - the
possible avoidance of undesirable results - may also be seen as a general reflection
of the unsuitability of the Edwards rule's current structure. If modification of the
rule's overbreadth through the identification of presumption-terminating events
would have been appropriate, perhaps the conclusive nature of the Edwards
presumption should be reconsidered.
Whether the irrebuttable presumption analysis of Edwards is in need of any
modification at all depends, of course, in part upon the extent to which its

counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available
to him," unless he validly waives his earlier request for the assistance of counsel. Id. at 94-95. This
"rigid" prophylactic rule, Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979), embodies two distinct inquiries:
First, courts must determine whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel.
Second, if the accused invoked his right to counsel, courts may admit his responses to
further questioning only on finding that he (a) initiated further discussions with the police,
and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked.
Smith 469 U.S. at 94-95 (citations omitted). In the pre-Edwards opinion of Fare v. Michael C., the Court
had noted:
The rule in Miranda ... was based on this Court's perception that the lawyer occupies
a critical position in our legal system because of his unique ability to protect the Fifth
Amendment rights of a client undergoing custodial interrogation. Because of this special
ability of the lawyer to help the client preserve his Fifth Amendment rights once the client
becomes enmeshed in the adversary process, the Court found that "the right to have
counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth
Amendment privilege under the system" established by the Court. [Miranda]
The per se aspect of Miranda was thus based on the unique role the lawyer plays in
the adversary system of criminal justice of this country.
Fare, 442 U.S. at 719.
118. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985).
119. George E. Dix, Promises, Confessions, and Wayne LaFave's Bright Line Rule Analysis, 1993
U. ILL. L. REv. 207, 231.
120. Id.
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overbreadth leads to undesirable or absurd results. In addition to considering the
intervening circumstances discussed above, the overbreadth of Edwards'prophylaxis
may be explored by positing an intervening event which does not fall into any ready
category. Assume that a suspect has adequately invoked the protection of Edwards
and remains incarcerated. While in jail, he approaches the authorities and volunteers
to serve as a police informant concerning other inmates' criminal activities which
are entirely unrelated to the matter about which he had been questioned. Thus, he
cannot be seen as reinitiating conversation about the subject matter of the
interrogation. The suspect remains "interrogation-proof' under Edwards. It cannot
seriously be argued that his actions still manifest the sort of helplessness in dealing
with authorities that Edwards was designed to address. It is not inappropriate to
contemplate unusual situations, however statistically improbable they may be, in
light of the myriad of unforeseeable intervening events that might occur under
Edwards.
On one level, this suspect's circumstance can be seen as no more than a mere
reflection of the fact that Edwards' irrebuttable presumption presents us with a
prophylactic rule. Such rules, of course, are overbroad by definition, and the cost
of sweeping some non-problematic situations within their protections are often
outweighed by their advantages. But, looking more closely, one might also examine
the nature of the evil sought to be avoided by Edwards - the badgering of a
suspect who has expressed helplessness without the assistance of counsel during
custodial interrogation - and ask whether its irrebuttable presumption and attendant
cost is necessary, or even appropriate, in furthering that goal. The sorts of facts that
might dispel, and may sometimes even conclusively dispel, the presumed
helplessness of a suspect may sometimes be easily ascertainable by the interrogating
authorities. To say that the application of Edwards to the suspect in the above
hypothetical "makes no sense" means more than just saying that the goals of
Edwards are not served when applied to an unintimidated suspect. Here, the result
enters into the realm of the absurd because the relevant facts concerning the
suspect's comfort level in communicating with authorities are not only obtainable
but are already known. The application of Edwards' irrebuttable presumption is not
only unfortunate, it is jarring.
It is at this point that the comments of Professors Stephen Schulhofer, David
Strauss and Joseph Grano are especially interesting, for their debate about the
distinctions between rebuttable and irrebuttable presumptions may shed some light
upon the question of which is most appropriate for Edwards. In 1987, Professor
Schulhofer examined Miranda's conclusive presumption of compulsion and
addressed the criticism of some, including Professor Grano, that it lacked
legitimacy.' He observed that "[a]ll agree that a court's responsibility for accurate
factfinding allows it to assign burdens of proof and to adopt rebuttable

121. See Schulhofer, supra note 12, at 448-51. Professor Schulhofer, in Reconstructing Miranda,
specifically addressed the view of Professor Grano voiced in Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in
Criminal Procedure:A Question of Article U Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 100 (1985) [hereinafter
Grano, Prophylactic Rules].
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presumptions."' " He took issue with the view that a conclusive presumption is
qualitatively different.'" Professor Schulhofer regarded "conclusive presumptions
and related forms of prophylactic rules" as "aids to adjudication,"'" and observed
that a conclusive presumption is at times the best way "to minimize adjudicatory
error.""IU "Of course, one must look closely at prophylactic rules to see whether
they are appropriate for the context in which the Court has applied them. But there
is nothing inherently improper or illegitimate about a rule just because it embodies
a conclusive presumption."'" Recognizing that the pervasiveness of prophylactic
rules alone does not necessarily establish their legitimacy,'" Professor Schulhofer
proceeded to argue that the irrebuttable presumption of Miranda was particularly
appropriate. The Court had arrived at its approach after "decades of experience with
case-by-case assessment of all the circumstances."''
Whatever logic may have suggested about the rigidity of conclusive
presumptions, experience had shown that the flexible due process test
created numerous problems, not only for suspects facing interrogation,
but also for the courts and for the police. Although the shift from due
process to the fifth amendment approach reduced the permissible degree
of pressure and ostensibly eliminated the basis for "balancing" the need
for a confession against the suspect's right to silence, other difficulties
of the due process approach remained. The flexible test had left lower
courts without usable standards and thus had created disproportionate
demands for case-by-case review in the federal courts. The problems of
judicial review also meant that intense interrogation pressures were
inadequately controlled in practice . . . . Finally, case-by-case [due
process] review left police without adequate guidance.
Under these circumstances, is it any wonder that the Court,
exasperated after years of case-by-case adjudication, finally adopted a
prophylactic rule? A conclusive presumption of compulsion is in fact
a responsible reaction to the problems of the voluntariness test, to the
rarity of cases in which compelling pressures are truly absent, and to the
adjudicatory costs of case-by-case decisions in this area."
Professor Schulhofer's view of both rebuttable and irrebuttable presumptions as
qualitatively comparable adjudicatory tools of varying suitability was shared by
Professor Strauss, who regarded them as equally legitimate.' Professor Strauss

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Schulhofer, supra note 12, at 450.
See id.
Id. at 448.
Id. at 450.
Id. at 451.
See id at 450.
Id. at 451.
Id at 451-53.
See generally Strauss, Prophylactic Rules, supra note 12.
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also noted that, in constructing rebuttable presumptions, courts consider both the
constitutional values at stake and "the institutional difficulties that courts face in
advancing those values."'' As to the formulation of the irrebuttable presumption
of Miranda, he advanced the view that a similar assessment of the capacity of the
judiciary was at work.' "Traditional constitutional theory calls for courts to admit
that they are not very good at finding the facts that bear on large-scale social
problems; Miranda made essentially that admission about the facts of a certain
category of particular cases."'3 To Professor Strauss, prophylactic rules with
structures paralleling that of Miranda'srule are common and legitimate features of
constitutional doctrine 34
Professor Grano's vigorous response to these views focused principally upon his
earlier concern - the legitimacy of the Court's imposition of Miranda'sjudicially
created prophylaxis.' 31 His subsequent writing has also made it clear that his
concerns about legitimacy also extend to rebuttable presumptions." Of particular
interest here, however, are Professor Grano's comments in 1988 about what he
perceived to be differences between the nature of rebuttable and conclusive
presumptions. Disagreeing with the views of Professors Schulhofer and Strauss that
they are qualitatively comparable, Professor Grano stated:
Conclusive presumptions differ in kind, not simply degree, from
rebuttable presumptions. Indeed, conclusive presumptions are not
evidentiary or adjudicatory devices at all, but rather substantive rules of
law:
In the case of what is commonly called a conclusive or irrebuttable
presumption, when fact B is proven, fact A must be taken as true, and
the adversary is not allowed to dispute this at all. For example, if it is
proven that a child is under seven years of age, the courts have stated
that it is conclusively presumed that he could not have committed a
felony. In so doing, the courts are not stating a presumption at all, but
simply expressing the rule of law that someone under seven years old
cannot legally be convicted of afelony.

131. d. at 192.
132. See id at 208.
133. Id. at 209.
134. See id. at 195-207.
135. See generally Grano, Miranda, supra note 13. For Professor Grano, the legitimacy of the
Court's imposition of the rule of Mirandaremained the principal issue.
A prophylactic rule in the constitutional context is a court-created rule that can be violated
without violating the Constitution itself. As the Supreme Court has explained with regard
to Miranda, the police may violate Miranda's prophylactic rules without necessarily
violating the Fifth Amendment. The proper question, therefore, is whether the
Constitution grants the Supreme Court authority to reverse a conviction, particularly a
state conviction, when no constitutional violation has occurred,
Id. at 176-77 (footnotes omitted).
136. See JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 195-96 (1993).
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therefore, to make the
The conclusive presumption operates,
37
presumed fact "legally immaterial."'
When examining the appropriateness of Edwards' conclusive presumption, it is
useful to consider these views. Was the rule of Edwards constructed under
circumstances in which the Court was prepared to regard the presumed fact - a
suspect's continuing helplessness - as legally immaterial? The rule itself belies any
such contention. By its own terms, a suspect who reinitiates a conversation about
the subject matter of the interrogation may then be reinterrogated. This aspect of
the Edwards rule is not merely a qualification of a stated proscription. It is a
manifestation of the Court's conclusion that suspect helplessness remains, under the
facts of a case, an important issue, and that reinitiation by the suspect is a sufficient
index of his or her change in perception. A suspect's reinitiation of a conversation
about a matter is certainly not identical to his or her statement that, "I am
sufficiently unintimidated to be reinterrogated without a lawyer present." But under
Edwards it is good enough. This suggests that the rule, in this aspect of its
structure, might more closely resemble a rebuttable presumption than a conclusive
one. The question of whether the policy of Edwards might also tolerate the
consideration of circumstances other than reinitiation which bear upon the issue of
suspect helplessness thus becomes an ancillary matter of efficacy and desirability,
rather than a structural mandate.
This brings us to the observation of Professor Strauss that institutional considerations are often critical in the formulation of both rebuttable and conclusive
presumptions. In few areas is this as evident as with Miranda. But do the same
institutional considerations warrant the importation of Miranda's conclusive
presumption analysis into the context of Edwards? Not necessarily.
The principal difference is in the interrogation room. Miranda'spresumption was
designed in part to influence police behavior which was sometimes spontaneous,
under a range of circumstances which often included the wish to obtain a quick
confession from a recently apprehended suspect. The absolute requirement that
Miranda'sprocedures be implemented, coupled with an irrebuttable presumption of
compulsion if they were not, was an effective tool in directing police activities. The
context of Edwards is quite different.
Once a suspect has asserted his or her right to an attorney, the possibility of
reinterrogation involves a need for considered judgment. The involvement of a
prosecutor is more frequent. A would-be interrogator must be aware of a suspect's
prior assertions of the right, 38 must examine the adequacy of such assertions, and
must consider whether the suspect has sufficiently reinitiated conversations so as to
permit questioning. The point raised by the Government during oral argument in
Green'39 - that such matters must be explored during a judicial review of the
reinterrogation - apply no less to the duties of the police. With the greater
137. Id.at 179 (quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 342 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 1984) (emphasis
added);

CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 640

n.2 (1954)).

138. This requirement is perhaps one of the most onerous tasks imposed by the Edwards doctrine.
139. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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availability of prosecutorial advice, the process of assessing the propriety of
reinterrogation under Edwards often lacks the need for on-the-spot police evaluation
that is evident with many initial interrogations. As was also observed by counsel
in Green, some of the matters which must already be considered under Edwards are
inherently fact-specific."4 In short, the institutional effect of a bright line,
conclusive presumption in regulating the activities of the police is significantly
different in the contexts of Miranda and Edwards. It should also be noted that
during the process of reinterrogation there are no urgent institutional circumstances
like those which have elsewhere served as a justification for a bright line rule for
law enforcement. A prominent modern example of this sort of factor, which has
appeared in both the Fourth and Fifth Amendment contexts, has been the need to
protect the safety of the public or the police. 4
A chief consideration that must be borne in mind when considering any
modification of the Edwards doctrine is the constant threat that its policies may be
undermined by law enforcement, prosecuting authorities, or by erroneous application
in the courts. Efforts to thwart Miranda's goals are well documented, 42 and
tinkering with Edwards is a risky business. That being said, it is still useful to
explore whether a modification of Edwards'conclusive presumption doctrine might
be workable and effective, for, as noted above, the problems posed by Edwards'
current breadth already include that of parsimonious implementation.
In application, the recasting of the Edwards presumption as rebuttable has the
potential for tailoring the Edwards doctrine in a logical manner, consistently with
its goals. Intervening events would be considered only as they bear upon the factual
assumption of suspect helplessness that is inherent in the rule. Thus, for example,
a break in custody followed by reapprehension and the resumption of custodial
interrogation would be examined for its potentially ameliorative or coercive effects,
and only if the sequence of events was in fact sufficiently likely to have dissipated
coercive influences would the presumption be rebutted. With this inquiry,
wholesale, overinclusive generalizations about the inevitable effects of all breaks in
custody would be avoided, and rarefied inquiries about non-existent factual
contingencies would be unnecessary.
As the presumption of Edwards is itself unique, so may be the formulation of any
burden of proof which, if satisfied, would permit it to be rebutted. The costs of
sacrificing the bright line qualities of Edwards' current approach, even for the
purpose of addressing significant problems, are not to be ignored. The Court has
repeatedly acknowledged that the certainty of Edwards' consistent application and

140. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
141. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653-60 (1984) (creating a public safety exception to
Miranda); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981) (holding that where an occupant of

automobile has been arrested, search incident to arrest justification authorizes search of entire passenger
compartment). Critical of Belton, Professor Wayne LaFave has noted that an important inquiry in the
consideration of a bright line rule for law enforcement should be "whether the bright line rule is
.responsive to a genuine need to forego case-by-case application of a principle." LaFave, supranote 113,
at 855.
142. See Weisselberg, supra note 113, at 132-40.
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the resulting preservation of its values are in large measure the reasons for its
retention." The challenge of modifying Edwards by constructing a high standard
for rebuttal that is not readily susceptible to abuse or misinterpretation is evident.
This challenge need not be insurmountable. When considering a standard, the
Court should not be confined to traditional verbal formulations which have had their
own checkered histories of implementation." In the context of a suspect having
expressed his or her need for counsel, the Court should make a number of things
clear. First, in light of the evolution of Edwards' very stringent approach, it may be
emphasized that the presumption that a suspect's expressed need continues is
exceedingly strong and that the circumstances under which it may be rebutted are
rare indeed. One possible formulation of this policy may state that only circumstances which compel a conclusion that the suspect's initial expression of helplessness
no longer obtains would permit reinterrogation. Second, in order to reduce the
possibility of a post hoc rationalization of official misconduct, only facts known to
the authorities at the time of a reinterrogation should be considered. Third, the
Court may specifically enumerate any circumstances which have insufficient bearing
upon the matter to be considered. For example, the Court may regard a suspect's
pro se appearance in a judicial proceeding as having little or no relevance to an
expressed need for counsel during custodial interrogation. Finally, expressing the
standard for rebuttal in general terms would not foreclose the Court from further
identifying any specific condition under which the standard might be deemed to be
satisfied. Thus, the passage of a specific, particularly lengthy period of time might
well have the bright line consequence of permitting reinterrogation.
Conclusion
It is quite possible that the Court would be reluctant to relinquish the certainty
provided by Edwards'current approach, and as suggested during argument in Green,
it may address current issues by identifying potential termination points for
Edwards' conclusive presumption. While this would itself represent a significant
modification of Edwards, it would also require the Court to anticipate each of the
conditions which would have such a terminating effect.
In any event, Edwards is already changing in the lower courts. The perpetuality
and reach of the rule in Edwards threatens to undermine its expansive implementation, and if the "break in custody" cases are any indication, courts may continue
to construct limitations upon Edwards which have little more doctrinal support than
the dictum in McNeil. The possibility of recasting Edwards' presumption as
rebuttable offers an alternative which may adequately further Edwards' goals and
provide the flexibility needed to address a variety of circumstances. An obvious

143. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
144. For example, application of the "clear and convincing evidence" standard of United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 240 (1967), necessary for the prosecution to establish an independent origin for a
courtroom identification after an improperly uncounselled lineup, has been less than rigorous. See
generally CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 17.05(a)
(1993).
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prerequisite to the Court's consideration of any such change must be its confidence
in the formulation of a high standard for rebuttal of the presumption and its
determination to insist upon its rigorous application. If the Court is of the view that
a high standard may be maintained in practice, it may yet come to regard the
recasting of the presumption as desirable.
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